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Abstract
We expound a method of analyzing cryptographic protocols using geometric
logic and the Chase. Geometric logic is a formal system of logic comparable
to first order logic, and the Chase is an algorithm which finds models for
a given geometric logic theory. We use the Strand Space formalism as a
model of protocol execution. Our work includes a rigorous translation of
the Strand Space formalism, developed at MITRE, into geometric logic, a
compiler that translates cryptographic protocols into geometric logic theories,
and an algorithm for checking isomorphism between protocol executions in
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One technique for analyzing a cryptographic protocol is to find a set of ex-
ecutions of the protocol that are representative of all possible executions.
This method is used by other tools such as Scyther[4] and CPSA[13]. In the
Strand Space formalism one execution is representative of another if there is a
homomorphism from it to the other. Once these executions are enumerated,
they can be used to reason about the protocol. For instance, if a message
comes from a friendly source in all representative executions, then it must
come from a friendly source in all possible executions. In general, if a prop-
erty is preserved by homomorphisms and holds in each of the representative
executions, then it must hold in all executions of the protocol.
We said above that the Chase finds a set of models of a geometric theory,
but it does more than that. The set of models produced by the Chase is
jointly universal, meaning that for any model M of the theory, there is a
homomorphism from one of the models produced by the Chase to M . Notice
the close analogy between this property of the Chase and the method of
protocol analysis. This is our primary motivation for analyzing protocols via
the Chase.
This study of protocol analysis also led our research to two purely mathe-
matical areas. First, we extend an algorithm by Aho, Hopcroft, and Ullman
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for checking rooted tree isomorphism in linear time to work on a larger class
of graphs. Specifically, we extend it to work on single-inbound digraphs :
directed graphs in which every vertex has in-degree at most one.
Second, a number of graph-like structures, such as relational structures
and directed graphs, are similar to graphs in that their homomorphism
and isomorphism problems have the same complexities as the corresponding
graph problems. We define and give several examples of structure-reductions
- functions from one kind of structure to another which preserve homomor-
phisms and isomorphisms.
We also overcame challenges presented directly by the conversion of pro-
tocols into theories. The theory for any protocol can be divided into two
parts. Part of the theory - the dynamic part - differs among protocols, but
the majority of it - the static part - is exactly the same for any protocol. We
implemented a protocol compiler, written in Haskell, which takes a protocol
description in a standard format, and outputs the dynamic part of its theory.
Upon discovering that the static part of the theory did not work well with
the Chase, we modified it, and showed that the modified theory is logically





2.1.1 Graphs and Digraphs
A graph is a set of vertices together with a set of unordered pairs of vertices
called edges. A finite graph can be drawn like so, with the dots denoting








A directed graph, or digraph, is like a graph, but its edges have direction.
Formally, a digraph is a set of vertices together with a set of ordered pairs
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Edge-labelled digraphs are digraphs whose edges have been arbitrarily
labeled. Formally, an edge-labeled digraph over a set of labels L is a set of
vertices V together with a set of ordered triples of the form (l, x, y), called
edges, with l ∈ L and x, y ∈ V .
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We will refer to all of these graph-like objects as structures, and uniformly
denote their vertices by V (A) and their edges by E(A).
In general, a homomorphism h from one structure A to another B is a
mapping from the vertices of A to the vertices of B that preserves edges.
Thus if e ∈ E(A) then h(e) ∈ E(B), where h(e) is defined by applying h
to each vertex in e. For instance, here is a drawing of a homomorphism
from an edge-labeled digraph G to an edge-labeled digraph H. The numbers
on the vertices of G describe which vertex in H they are being mapped to.
Notice that not every vertex in H is the image of a vertex in G; this is not
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An isomorphism φ from one structure A to another B is a homomorphism
whose inverse is also a homomorphism. This means that φ is a bijection
between the vertices of A and the vertices of B which preserves edges in















The homomorphism relation is reflexive because the identity function is
always a homomorphism from a thing to itself. It is also transitive, because
the composition of a homomorphism from X to Y and a homomorphism from
Y to Z is itself a homomorphism from X to Z. Thus the homomorphism
relation forms what is called a quasi-order. But homomorphisms are not, in
general, antisymmetric (that is, they do not necessarily form a partial order).
Take, for instance, the following digraphs
• // • •oo • // •
These digraphs are not isomorphic, yet there are homomorphisms from each
to the other. When there are homomorphisms from each of two things to the
other, we call them homomorphically equivalent.
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2.1.2 Relational Structures
Relational structures are generalizations of digraphs in which edges are col-
ored and may have more (or fewer) than two vertices. An edge’s color,
however, fixes the number of vertices it has. Colors are called relation sym-
bols, the number of vertices of an edge is called its arity, and the mapping
from relation symbols to arities is called a signature.
More formally, a signature is a pair (S,A), where S is a set of objects
called relation symbols, and A is a function from relation symbols to natural
numbers, called the symbol’s arity.
A relational structure over a given signature (S,A) is a set of objects
called vertices and a set of facts. Each fact is a relation symbol R from
S applied to an n-tuple of vertices, where n is A(R). A fact with relation
symbol R applied to vertices x1, ..., xn is written R(x1, ..., xn).
2.1.3 Cores of Graphs
Core An object for which every endomorphism is also an automorphism.
Antichain A set of objects unrelated by homomorphisms.
The concept of the core of a graph is important when studying homo-
morphisms, because the image of a core under a homomorphism must be an
identical core. This property follows immediately from the definition of a
core. The following theorems appear in class notes from Peter Cameron[3].
The proofs are largely our own, however, and do not assume the graphs are
finite as Cameron’s proofs do.
Lemma 1. A homomorphism equivalence class has at most one core.
Proof. If an equivalence class has two cores, then there are homomorphisms
from each to the other, φ and φ′. Consider the compositions φ◦φ′ and φ′ ◦φ.
The first is an endomorphism from the first object to itself, and hence an
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automorphism, and the second is an endomorphism from second object to
itself, hence an automorphism. Since both φ◦φ′ and φ′◦φ are bijections, so are
φ and φ′. Now we can show that φ is an isomorphism. We already know that
it is a bijective homomorphism, so we need only show that it’s inverse φ−1 is
a homomorphism. φ−1 is equal to (φ′ ◦ φ)−1 ◦ φ′, which is the composition of
an automorphism and a homomorphism, which is a homomorphism. Thus φ
is an isomorphism and the equivalence class’s cores are isomorphic.
We have made use of the fact that if f◦g and g◦f are both bijections, then
f and g are bijections. This claim warrants demonstration. Let f :: A→ B
and g :: B → A. First, since f ◦g is onto, for all a in A, ∃x ∈ A. f(g(x)) = a.
Thus ∃b ∈ B. f(b) = a, namely b = g(x), and f is onto. And since f ◦g is one-
to-one, for all x and y in A, g(x) = g(y) =⇒ f(g(x)) = f(g(y)) =⇒ x = y,
so g is one-to-one. By symmetry, f must also be one-to-one and g must also
be onto, so both f and g are bijections.
Lemma 2. A core is uniquely represented as an antichain of connected cores.
Proof. Every core is the disjoint union of some connected components. Each
component must be a core, or else it would have an endomorphism which is
not an automorphism and so would the whole object. Likewise, there can be
no homomorphism between components, since it could be used to construct
an endomorphism which is not an automorphism by mapping one component
to the other, and every other component to itself. Thus the components of
any core, which are themselves connected cores, form an antichain.
Lemma 3. A graph G is uniquely represented as the infinite sequence |Hom(Fi, G)|
for any enumeration of all finite graphs Fi.
In “Homomorphisms on Infinite Directed Graphs”[2], Bauslaugh points
out that cores ought be defined as graphs for which every endomorphism is
an automorphism, and not as a vertex-minimal member of a graph homo-
morphism equivalence class as suggested by Cameron[3]. For finite graphs,
these definitions are equivalent, but for infinite graphs only the latter results
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in cores being unique. Consider, for instance, the (countably) infinite graph
with vertices {0, 1, 2, ...} and edges {(x, y)|x < y}. Under the vertex-minimal
core definition, this graph has an infinite number of cores, given by the sub-
graphs induced by {n, n+ 1, n+ 2, ...} for any n ≥ 1. These are in the same
homomorphism equivalence class: a forward homomorphism maps x to x+n,
and a reverse homomorphism maps x to x. And each core is indeed vertex
minimal: they each have infinitely many vertices, and there is no homomor-
phism to any finite graph, since that graph would have to include a clique of
every order.
2.2 Geometric Logic
Geometric logic is a formal system of logic comparable to first order logic.
A formula in geometric logic, called a geometric theory, is a conjunction
of implications between positive existential formulas. Positive existential
formulas are similar to a first order logic formulas, but lack negation and
universal quantification. They may also have infinitary disjunctions, though
we will not make use of this fact. The form of geometric theories makes them
particularly amenable to logical analysis.
2.2.1 Definitions
A signature is a set of function symbols F together with a set of relation
symbols R and a mapping arity :: F ∪ R → N. The arity function will give
the number of arguments each relation symbol and function symbol takes.
Fix a signature (F,R, arity) and an infinite set of variables V .
1. A term is either a variable x ∈ V or a function application f(t1, ..., tn)
where f ∈ F and arity(f) = n and t1, ..., tn are terms.
2. An atom has the form r(t1, ..., tn), where r ∈ R, arity(r) = n, and
t1, ..., tn are terms.
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3. An atomic formula is true, or false, or an equation over terms t1 = t2,
or an atom.
4. A conjunctive formula has the form α1 ∧ ..., αn, where α1, ..., αn are
atomic.
5. Positive existential formulas are the closure of existential quantifiers,
finitary conjunctions, and infinitary disjunctions over atomic formulas.
More formally, a positive existential formula is,
• An atomic formula, or
• ∃x.α, where α is positive existential, or
• α ∧ β, where α and β are positive existential, or
• ∨i∈I αi, where I is any set and each αi is positive existential.
6. A geometric logic formula has the form α ⇒ β, where α and β are
positive existential. A geometric logic formula may be open, and if so
it is implicitly universally quantified over its free variables.
7. A geometric logic theory, geometric theory, or just theory, is a set of
geometric logic formulas. Semantically, it is the conjunction of those
formulas.
8. A relational structure consists of a setD called its domain together with
an interpretation function I that assigns a meaning to each relation
symbol and function symbol. Specifically, I assigns a function of type
Dn → D to each function symbol of arity n and a relation of type Dn
to each relation symbol of arity n.
9. A relational structure M satisfies a geometric theory T , written M |=
T if every mapping from the free variables of the theory to domain
elements of the structure makes the formulas of the theory true, under
the usual semantics of logic. We will also write M |=E T to mean
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that M makes the formulas of T true under the particular mapping
E. Any such mapping from variables to domain elements is called
an environment. The models of a theory are the relational structures
which satisfy it. Two theories are equivalent if they have the same set
of models.
10. A homomorphism from one relational structure to another is a map-
ping from the domain of the first to the domain of the second that
preserves functions and relations. We write A
h−→ B to mean that h is
a homomorphism from A to B, and A→ B to mean that some homo-
morphism exists. In the simple case that A and B contain no function
symbols, then for all relation symbols R,
If (x1, ..., xn) ∈ A(R) then (h(x1), ..., h(xn)) ∈ B(R)
A homomorphism A→ B should capture the idea that A is a general-
ization of B.
11. Let S be a set of models of a theory T . If for every model M of T there
is a model M ′ ∈ S such that M ′ →M , then we call S jointly universal.
If M1 can be thought of as representative of M2 whenever M1 → M2,
then a jointly universal set of models of a theory is representative of
all models of a theory. This fact will be fundamental to our approach
to protocol analysis.
2.2.2 Eliminating Redundant Constructs
A number of the “features” a geometric logic are redundant, in that any
geometric theory can be written without them. Either functions or existential
quantifiers can be eliminated in lieu of the other, and equations may be
eliminated outright.
This rewriting will take a geometric theory T and produce another theory
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T ′ whose formulas do not use functions (or existential quantifiers, or equa-
tions), but whose signature is an extension of the signature of T . It would
be convenient to say that T and T ′ are equivalent, but equivalence not well
defined because their signatures differ. All that can be said is that they are
effectively equivalent in that there is a mapping from models of T to models
of T ′ that preserves homomorphisms in both directions.
Existential quantifiers may be eliminated in a very simple way. For each
existentially quantified formula ∃x.α with free variables ~y, introduce a new
function symbol f and return α[f(~y)/x] (that is, α with all occurrences of x
replaced by f(~y)).
Equations t1 = t2 may be eliminated from a function-free theory by in-
troducing a relation E to describe equality. First, equality must be reflexive,
commutative, and transitive, so introduce the formulas,
true⇒ E(x, x)
E(x, y)⇒ E(y, x)
E(x, y) ∧ E(y, z)⇒ E(x, z)
Second, the relations of the theory must be well-defined with respect to
equality, so for each relation R of arity n and for each parameter position
1 ≤ i ≤ n of R, add the formula
R(x1, ..., xn) ∧ E(xi, y)⇒ R(x1, ..., xi−1, y, xi+1, ..., xn)
Finally, replace each equation t1 = t2 with E(t1, t2).
Conversely, functions may be eliminated from a geometric theory in lieu
of existential quantifiers by the following transformation. For each function
symbol f of arity n, introduce a new relation symbol F of arity n+1 to denote
that “the last argument is equal to f applied to the first n arguments”. Since
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functions should be complete and well-defined, add the formulas,
true⇒ ∃y.F (x1, ..., xn, y)
F (x1, ..., xn, y) ∧ F (x1, ..., xn, y)⇒ x = y
Now any formula that makes use of f , such as
R(f(x, x, x))⇒ ∃y.R(f(x, y, z))
may be replaced by
F (x, x, x, a) ∧R(a)⇒ ∃y.F (x, y, z, b) ∧R(b)
For conceptual clarity, we will focus on function-free theories with the in-
tention that theories that do make use of functions can always be transformed
into ones that do not.
2.2.3 C.D.E. Form
Lemma 4. Positive existential formulas can always be written in D.E.C form
(for disjunction of existentials). ∨
i∈I
∃~xiαi
where αi are conjunctive formulas.
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Proof. Rewrite a formula using the following identities,

















Likewise, geometric logic theories can always be written in such a way





where α and β are conjunctive. We will call this the C.D.E form.
Lemma 5. For every geometric theory T , there is an equivalent theory T ′ in
C.D.E. form.
Proof. To see this, first write the left and right parts of each formula in the
form
∨























The Chase is an algorithm which finds a jointly universal set of models of a
geometric theory. It is based upon a nondeterministic algorithm which may
find a single model of a theory (or may fail). This nondeterministic algorithm
is called a run of the Chase. We will describe the Chase in terms of theories
expressed without function symbols, and with only finite disjunctions; it can
be extended to cover these possibilities.
2.3.1 Chase Runs
The behavior of a run of the Chase is intuitive. It keeps a model and repeat-
edly picks an unsatisfiable formula from the theory and augments the model
to satisfy one of the disjuncts. If all of the formulas of a theory become sat-
isfied, a model of the theory has been found and is returned. On the other
hand, if an unsatisfied disjunct (such as ⊥) is chosen, the run fails.
An example of a Chase run may be clarifying. Consider the following
simple theory about message transmissions in the Strand Space Formalism:
Send(n, m) => Node(n) & Mesg(m)
Recv(n, m) => Node(n) & Mesg(m)
Node(n) => Exists m. Send(m)
| Exists m. Recv(m)
Send(n, m1) & Send(n, m2) => m1 = m2
Recv(n, m1) & Recv(n, m2) => m1 = m2
Send(n, m1) & Recv(n, m2) => false
Recv(n, m) => Exists n’. Send(n’, m)
The relation Send(n, m) means that n is a transmission node and msg(n) =
m, and Recv(n, m) means that n is a reception node with msg(n) = m.
Let’s begin with the model
{ Node(0) }
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By formula 3 with binding n→ 0, choosing the second disjunct,
{ Node(0), Recv(0, 1) }
By formula 2 with binding n→ 0,m→ 1,
{ Node(0), Recv(0, 1), Mesg(1) }
By formula 7 with binding n→ 0,m→ 1,
{ Node(0), Recv(0, 1), Mesg(1), Send(2, 1) }
By formula 2 with binding n→ 2,m→ 1,
{ Node(0), Recv(0, 1), Mesg(1), Send(2, 1), Node(2) }
All formulas are now satisfied, so the run has found a model of the theory.
2.3.2 The Chase Algorithm
The Chase as a whole works by branching to explore many runs simultane-
ously. It keeps track of several models and repeatedly selects a model, then
selects a formula and environment which that model does not satisfy. Next
it constructs several new models from the old one by forcing each disjunct,
in turn, to be satisfied, and adds this models to its list.
2.3.3 Algorithms
Chase Runs
A run of the Chase is a nondeterministic algorithm which takes a geometric
theory and may either produce a model of that theory or fail.
# run : : Theory −> Model | Fa i l
run ( thy ) = loop ( emptyModel ) where
loop (M) =
i f s a t i s f i e s (M, thy )
then y i e l d M
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e l s e Let (E, ’A => B1 | . . . | Bn ’ ) = pickFormula (M, thy )
Nonde t e rm in i s t i c a l l y choose a natura l number i in 1 . . n
case coe r c e (Bi , M) o f
Fa i l → Fa i l
M’ → loop (M’ )
pickFormula(M , T ) nondeterministically picks an environment E and for-
mula f ∈ T such that M does not satisfy f under E.
It is essential that the Chase never leave a (formula, environment) pair
unevaluated forever. An implementation that always eventually examines
any (formula, environment) pair is called fair , and one that doesn’t is called
unfair. We will continue to assume that Chase implementations are fair,
since their universality property relies on this.
Definition 1. Let r be an infinite run of the chase on theory T which has
models M0 → M1 → M2 → ... at each step as it runs, with M0 being the
empty model. r is fair if for all i, whenever f is a formula of T and E is
an environment over the domain of Mi such that Mi 6|=Ef , there is a step
Mj →Mj+1 for some j ≥ i in which pickFormula(Mj, T ) returns (E, f).
A nonterminating fair run of the Chase will yield as its limit an infinite
model of the theory. In this way, nonterminating runs of the Chase are
correct, though not very helpful in practice.
Disjunct Coercion
The coercion algorithm takes a conjunctive formula f , a model M , and an
environment E and either produces a new model M ′ such that M →M ′ and
M ′ |=E f or fails. It is most easily described as a stateful algorithm over M
and E (that is, it will modify M and E as it runs, and its output is the value
of M when it finishes).
# algor i thm
# coerce : : Conjunct ive Formula −> Model −> Environment −> Model | Fa i l
coe r c e ( ’ true ’ ) = return ;
coe r c e ( ’ f a l s e ’ = FAIL ;
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coe r c e ( ’R(x1 , . . . , xn ) ’ ) =
Add (E( x1 ) , . . . , E( xn ) ) to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f R in M;
return ;
coe r c e ( ’ x = y ’ ) =
Replace a l l o c cur r ence s o f E(x ) with E(y ) in M;
Bind x to E(y ) in E;
re turn ;
coe r c e ( ’ a & b ’ ) =
coe r c e ( a ) ;
coe r c e (b ) ;
r e turn ;
coe r c e ( ’ Ex i s t s x . a ’ ) =
Generate a f r e s h domain element c in M;
Bind x to c in E;
coe r c e ( a ) ;
r e turn ;
The Chase
# chase : : Theory −> [ Model ]
chase ( thy ) = loop ( [ emptyModel ] ) where
loop (models ) =
i f empty (models )
then [ ]
e l s e l e t M = f i r s t ( models )
i f s a t i s f i e s (M, thy )
then y i e l d M
loop ( r e s t ( models ) )
e l s e l e t (E, ’A => B1 | . . . | Bn ’ ) = pickFormula (M, thy )
newModels = [ ]
f o r i = 1 . . n do
case coe r c e (M, E, Bi ) o f
Fa i l → do nothing
M’ → add M’ to newModels
loop (models ++ newModels )
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2.3.4 Theorems
We prove here two theorems claimed in the notes[7] of Professor Dougherty
of WPI.
Lemma 6. If a step of the Chase changes M to M ′, then M →M ′.
Proof. Let h be the identity homomorphism from M to M . When coercing
βi, update the homomorphism h. Let E
′ be an extension of h◦E under which
both α and βi are true. The only danger is that the act of coercing βi will
invalidate the homomorphism h. There are three cases in which this could
occur. First, if an atomic formula R(x1, ..., xn) is encountered, coercion will
add (E(x1), ..., E(xn)) to RM . But R(x1, ..., xn) is already satisfied by M
′
under h ◦ E. Second, if an existential formula ∃x.γ is encountered, coercion
will bind x to a fresh domain element in M . In this case, set h(E(x)) = E ′(x).
Third, if x = y is coerced, E(x) and E(y) will be identified. But since M ′
already satisfies this formula under h ◦ E, h(E(x)) = h(E(y)), so nothing
needs to be done.
Theorem 1. For any model M ′ of a theory T , there is a run of the Chase
on T which yields a model M such that M →M ′.
Proof. We will use the model M ′ as an oracle to guide the run. Keep a
map h from the domain of the Chase model M to the domain of M ′. To
begin, the Chase model is empty and so is h. As the Chase progresses, we
will maintain the invariant that h describes a homomorphism M → M ′.
Suppose the Chase picks a formula f = α ⇒ β1 ∨ ... ∨ βn and environment
E. M |=E α, so M ′ |=h◦E α. Since M ′ satisfies the theory, we also know
M ′ |=h◦E f . To satisfy both α and β, M ′ must satisfy one of the disjuncts,
say βi. So M
′ |=h◦E βi. Have the Chase run choose βi. The homomorphism
h can be updated per the above lemma.
Theorem 2. A geometric theory is satisfiable if and only if there is a fair
run of the Chase which does not fail.
21
Proof. First, see that if a geometric theory is satisfiable then there is a run
of the Chase which does not fail. This follows from the previous theorem -
the theory is satisfiable, so it has a model M , so there is a run of the Chase
that produces a model M ′ with M ′ →M .
Next, see that if a geometric theory is unsatisfiable then every fair run of
the Chase fails. Clearly no run could succeed, because it succeeds only when
it finds a model of the theory. Nor could the Chase run forever, because then
the theory would be satisfied by the model formed by taking the union of
the structures formed by the Chase at each iteration (by the chain theorem
above).
2.4 The Strand Space Formalism
The Strand Space formalism is a mathematical model for formally reasoning
about cryptographic protocols. It was developed by researchers at MITRE,
including Joshua Guttman, Javier Thayer, and Jonathan Herzog, beginning
in 1998 [14] [11] [9]. Our description of strand spaces is largely adapted from
the relevant publications.
The Strand Space formalism distinguishes between two different kinds of
participants: regular participants and an adversary. A single physical entity
can be represented as multiple regular strands if it executes more than one
session.
Participants in a protocol run are represented by strands, and communi-
cate with each other by sending and receiving messages. A regular participant
is represented by a regular strand and must follow the protocol. The adver-
sary is represented by zero or more adversary strands, and can manipulate
the messages that regular strands send and receive.
The actions of both the regular participants and the adversary are ab-
stracted into message passing; this is assumed to be able to capture all rel-
evant information. For instance, if a private key is assumed insecure and
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the adversary may be able to learn it, this could only be represented by an
adversary strand receiving the key. As such, every strand consists of a (non-
empty) sequence of message passing events called nodes. Each node either
sends a message or receives a message. A term is any possible message.
In our representation of this formalism, nodes and terms are the first-class
objects. Strands are represented only indirectly through nodes.
2.4.1 Messages
The Strand Space formalism admits different message algebras. In the alge-
bra we will use, a message may either be basic and indivisible, or it may be
the encryption or pairing of two other messages. To be precise,
• Every basic message is a message.
• If x and y are messages, then the pair (x, y) is a message.
• If x and k are messages, then the encryption {|x|}k is a message. We
call x the plain-text and k the key.
We call the pairing operation pairing rather than concatenation because it
is not assumed to be associative.
One message is an ingredient of another, written m1 v m2 when it can
be obtained by repeated unpairing and decryption operations. Formally, v
is defined inductively by,
• x v x
• x v (x, y)
• y v (x, y)
• x v {|x|}y
• If x v y and y v z then x v z
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The sub-message relation, written m1  m2 is like the ingredient relation,
except that an encryption key is considered a sub-message of an encryption.
• x x
• x (x, y)
• y  (x, y)
• x {|x|}y
• y  {|x|}y
• If x y and y  z then x z
A message m originates at a node n if n is a transmission node, m v
msg(n), and whenever n′ ⇒+ n, m 6v msg(n′). A message uniquely origi-
nates if it originates at a unique node, and it is non-originating if it does not
originate at any node.
We are going to assume that unspecified messages are basic. For instance,
if a protocol specification states that a principal A receives a message {|x|}kA
where kA is A’s public key and x is unspecified, x may not be a pair (y, z).
And if A receives a message of the form {|(y, z)|}kA for any y and z, the
receiving strand should terminate. We make this assumption for simplicity.
It makes it easier to unify messages. Removing it may be a consideration for
future work.
A homomorphism on messages is a function h :: M1 →M2 such that
• h(x) is basic whenever x is basic
• h((x, y)) = (h(x), h(y))
• h({|x|}k) = {|h(x)|}h(k)
This definition of message homomorphisms is not identical to the usual
Strand Space definition, simply because in our algebra indeterminants must
be basic, while in the proper definition they may be replaced by any message.
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2.4.2 Strand Spaces
Fix a set of possible messages M . A directed message is a pair (m, d) such
that m ∈ M and d is either + or -. We will call nodes for which d = −
reception nodes, and nodes for which d = + transmission nodes. We will
write msg(n) = m and dir(n) = d when n = (m, d). Let D denote the
set of all directed messages. A Strand Space is a set of strands Σ together
with a partial function trace :: Σ → D+ from strands to finite sequences
of directed messages. Strand represent participants in the protocol, and
directed messages are their actions: message transmissions and receptions.
Now fix a strand space (Σ, tr). A node is a pair (s, n) such that s ∈ Sigma
and n ∈ N such that n is no larger than the length of s. We will write
msg((s, n)) to mean the nth directed message of s. We will say that one node
n1 is the parent of another node n2 when they are in the same strand and n1
immediately precedes n2; in other words, when n1 = (s, i) and n2 = (s, i+ 1)
for some strand s ∈ Σ and natural number i ∈ N .
2.4.3 Infiltrated Skeletons
We ended up using a model of protocol executions that we call infiltrated skele-
tons. An infiltrated skeleton consists of partially executed regular and ad-
versarial strands, a set of links on the nodes of the strands, a set of mes-
sages unique representing unique-origination assumptions, and a set of mes-
sages non representing non-origination assumptions. For those familiar with
Strand Space terminology, an infiltrated skeleton can be thought of as a com-
bination of a bundle and a skeleton; it contains both the adversarial strands
of a bundle and the origination assumptions of a skeleton. The following
definition is largely an adaption of the definition of a skeleton in the Strand
Space formalism[9]. Formally, an infiltrated skeleton over a set of messages
M consists of,
• A finite set of (regular and/or adversarial) nodes N
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• A binary relation → on N
• A finite set of basic messages non
• A finite set of basic messages uniq
• A partial order ≤ on N
such that
• If n1 ⇒ n2 and n2 ∈ N then n1 ∈ N .
• If n1 → n2 then dir(n1) = +, dir(n2) = −, and msg(n1) = msg(n2).
• Whenever dir(n) = −, there is another node n′ such that n′ → n.
• ≤ is a subset of the reflexive transitive closure of → ∪ ⇒.
• ∀k ∈ non.∀n ∈ N.k 6v msg(n)
• ∀k ∈ non.∃n ∈ N. either k  msg(n) or k−1  msg(n).
• ∀a ∈ uniq.∃n ∈ N.a msg(n)
• ∀a ∈ uniq. if a originates at n ∈ N then
– a originates at no other node in N
– If a  msg(n′) where n′ ∈ N , then n ≤ n′ (where ≤ is the
reflexive transitive closure of → and ⇒)
We will sometimes refer to infiltrated skeletons simply as skeletons. When
we do, we are speaking loosely, and are not referring to traditional Strand
Space skeletons.
A link is an edge from a sending node to a receiving node that have the
same message. If there is a node n with a link to a node m, n sends m a
message and m receives it unaltered. There is also a partial order ≤ on nodes
which is a superset of the transitive closure of→ and⇒. We say that a node
n1 precedes another node n2 when n1 ≤ n2.
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2.4.4 Homomorphisms
A homomorphism from one infiltrated skeleton A to another B is a pair
(α, φ), where α is a homomorphism on messages and φ :: NA → NB such
that
1. Whenever n1 ⇒ n2, φ(n1)⇒ φ(n2)
2. ∀n ∈ NA.dir(n) = dir(φ(n))
3. ∀n ∈ NA.msg(φ(n)) = α(msg(n))
4. n1 ≤ n2 implies φ(n1) ≤ φ(n2)
5. α(nonA) ⊆ nonB
6. α(uniqA) ⊆ uniqB
7. If a ∈ uniqA and a originates at n, then α(a) originates at φ(n)
2.4.5 Protocols
In the Strand Space formalism, a protocol is a finite set of strands called
roles, together with a set of unique-origination constraints and a set of non-
origination constraints. The roles describe the actions of the regular par-
ticipants in the protocol. A unique-origination constraint over a set of roles
mentions a message appearing in one of the roles (possibly as a sub-message).
It denotes the assumption that that message originates only in that strand.
For instance, if a protocol involves one of the principals generating a fresh,
never-seen-before nonce, that could be captured by a unique origination con-
straint on the message representing that nonce in the role of that principal.
Likewise, a non-origination constraint mentions a message appearing in one
of the roles, and it denotes the assumption that that message does not orig-
inate in any strand. When a principal is trusted only to execute a role with
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a well-kept secret, this can be expressed as a non-origination constraint on
that secret.
2.4.6 The Adversary
The Adversary in the Strand Space formalism is of typical Dolev-Yao style.
He has full control of the network (and may thus obtain any message trans-
mitted by a regular strand), and is capable of the following operations:
Generation The Adversary may obtain any basic message that is not oth-
erwise assumed to be secure.
Unpairing If the Adversary can obtain the pair (x, y), then he may decon-
struct it to obtain x and y individually.
Decryption If the Adversary can obtain the encryption {|x|}k and the de-
cryption key k−1, he can also obtain the plain-text m.
Pairing If the Adversary can obtain messages x and y, then he may also
obtain the pair (x, y).
Encryption The Adversary may perform an encryption to obtain the mes-
sage {|x|}k if he has obtained the plain-text m and the encryption key
k.
The capabilities of the Adversary can be captured by strands that per-
form the operations. A pairing operation, for instance, may be represented
by a strand with three nodes: the first receives a message x, the second
receives a message y, and the third transmits the message (x, y). These
classes of strands are called adversarial strands, and are shown below. We
call these strands generation, pairing, encryption, unpairing, and decryp-
tion strands respectively. They can be divided into two categories: those
that involve constructing a message and those that involve deconstructing
a message to obtain its ingredients. We will call generation, pairing, and
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encryption strands constructive, and we will call unpairing and decryption
strands deconstructive. Likewise, a constructive node is one that is part of
a constructive strand, and a deconstructive node is one that appears on a
deconstructive strand.













The Strand Space formalism is a well-established mathematical model of
cryptographic protocols. It can be used to reason about protocols and their
possible executions, and under the assumption of ideal cryptography, any
conclusion proved using the formalism will be true. This makes it an excellent




Our approach to protocol analysis has two stages. In the first, a protocol is
translated into a geometric theory such that the models of the theory repre-
sent infiltrated skeletons describing the possible executions of the protocol.
In the second stage, the Chase is used to find a jointly universal set of models,
which can be interpreted as possible executions of the protocol.
The theory for any protocol can be divided into two parts: a small dy-
namic set of formulas that vary between protocols, and a larger static set of
formulas that are always the same. We generate the dynamic formulas via
our compiler, and we wrote the static formulas by hand. Our protocol com-
piler takes as input a protocol, written as an S-Expression, in a format also
used by some other protocol analysis tools, such as Scyther[4] and CPSA[13].
It outputs the dynamic portion of a theory, such that the models of the com-
bined theory represent the possible executions of the protocol. The source for
the compiler itself is in appendix D. A sample compiler input - that for the
Needham-Schroeder protocol - can be found in appendix A, and its output
may be found in appendix B.
The Needham-Schroeder protocol is a simple communication protocol be-
tween two parties. It is often used as an example because it contains a vul-
nerability which is not obvious. Below is a drawing of a correct execution of
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• oo {|NA,NB |}KA
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• {|NB |}KB // •




Here KA and KB are the public asymmetric keys of A and B, and NA and
NB are large randomly generated messages called nonces. They can be as-
sumed to originate uniquely because of the extreme improbability of the same
message being generated by someone else. There is a vulnerability in this
protocol from B’s perspective, but not from A’s perspective. We won’t delve
into the attack, other than to say that it stems from the fact that A never
announces her intention to communicate with B, and can be fixed by adding
B to the second message.
3.1 The Correctness Criterion
The fact that the models returned by the Chase are jointly universal is funda-
mental to our purpose. Since we use models to represent protocol executions,
we would like the set of executions returned by the Chase to be representa-
tive of all possible executions of a protocol. Specifically, we would like them
to be jointly universal under skeleton homomorphisms. This leads to the
following correctness criterion.
For any protocol P , let TP be the geometric theory obtained by taking
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the union of the output of the compiler with the static theory. We would
like the finite models of TP to mimic as closely as possible the infiltrated
skeletons of P . Specifically, there should be a mapping from the infiltrated
skeletons of P to the finite models of TP with a one-to-one correspondence
between the homomorphisms of the skeletons and the homomorphisms of the
models.
This idea is captured by the notion of a full and faithful functor from
category theory. A category is a set of objects together with a set of mor-
phisms between them that obey certain axioms; for a full definition see [12].
We will only concern ourselves with categories whose morphisms are homo-
morphisms.
Definition 2. A functor F from a category A to a category B is a mapping
that,
• Associates to each object a ∈ A an object b ∈ B
• Associates to each morphism x → y ∈ A a morphism F(x) → F(y) ∈
B
such that,
• F maps identity morphisms to identity morphisms
• If g is a morphism x → y ∈ A and h is a morphism y → z ∈ A then
F(g ◦ h) = F(g) ◦ F(h)
F is faithful if it maps distinct morphisms to distinct morphisms. It is full
if for every morphism h : F(x) → F(y) there exists an h′ : x → y such that
F(h′) = h. It is invertible if for every object b ∈ B, there exists an object
a ∈ A such that F(a) = b.
Definition 3. For every protocol P , let SP be the category whose objects are
the infiltrated skeletons of P and whose morphisms are the homomorphisms
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among those skeletons. Likewise, let MP be the category whose objects are
the finite models of TP and whose morphisms are the homomorphisms over
those models.
Definition 4. A theory T correctly represents a protocol P if there exists
an invertible full and faithful functor F from SP to MP . We say that F
witnesses the correctness of TP .
We can now state the correctness criterion.
Theorem 3 (Correctness). For any protocol P , TP correctly represents P .
Corollary 1. Let P be any protocol, let F be a witness of the correctness of
TP , and let M be a set of jointly universal models of TP . Then F−1(M) is a
set of jointly universal infiltrated skeletons of P .
We believe this theorem to be true, though it is infeasible to prove it. Such
a proof would involve formally reasoning about our compiler - a nontrivial
Haskell program. We will, however, present evidence in favor of this theorem
in sections 3.4 to 3.4.2. Specifically, we will explain how to construct the
functor F from the above theorem, and argue that it will be full, faithful,
and invertible.
3.2 Normalization and Efficiency
In the Strand Space Formalism, the Adversary is often capable of accom-
plishing the same task in multiple ways. Without loss of generality, however,
we can assume that he refrains from certain sequences of actions that are
unproductive. Guttman and Thayer[10] proved that two such conditions,
normality and efficiency do not limit the adversary’s capabilities.
The efficiency condition requires that the adversary always takes a mes-
sage from the earliest point at which it appears. To be precise, if n1 ≤ n2,
dir(n1) = dir(n2) = +, msg(n1) = msg(n2), and n2 → n3, then n1 = n2.
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The second condition is called normalization and requires that the ad-
versary never performs a deconstructive operation (unpairing or decryption)
immediately following a constructive operation (pairing or encryption). To
be precise, this is saying that there is never a link (n1, n2) such that n1 is a
deconstructive node and n2 is a constructive node.
We added formulas expressing the normalization and efficiency constraints
to the static portion of the theory. These two conditions help prune the ad-
versarial actions the Chase will search for and may thereby increase the
number of protocols for which it will terminate.
3.3 Chains
Even after introducing the normalization and efficiency constraints, the Chase
generally never terminated on any protocol. The culprit was a single formula
that states that when a node receives a message, some other node must have
sent it. We will call this the link formula.
Recv(n, m) => Exists n’. Link(n’, n)
This led the Chase to explore the possible nodes that could have sent the
message, which include nodes on strands that include another reception node.
The same formula can be applied to this new reception node, and so forth.
The solution is a concept put forth by Cas Cremers[4] [5] called chaining.
The chaining condition is a generalization of the normalization condition.
Simply put, the idea is that the ingredients of a message constructed by the
adversary can always be traced back to regular strands.
To describe chains in more detail, we will need some terminology. A path
is a sequence of nodes n1, n2, ... such that for any two nodes ni, ni+1 that are
adjacent in the sequence, either ni ⇒ ni+1 or ni → ni+1. A proper path from
a node n1 to a node nk is a path n1, ..., nk such that n1 → n2 and nk−1 → nk.
Finally, a deconstruction chain, or just chain, is a proper path on which all
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nodes, except possible the first and last nodes, are deconstructive. We will
write Chain(n, n′) to mean that there is a chain from n to n′. Next, notice
that every node must be either constructive, deconstructive, or regular. We
will make use of this fact.
Now imagine tracing an ingredient of a message back along a path. Ei-
ther that message came from a regular strand, or it was received immediately
after being constructed by the adversary (via pairing or encryption), or it
was received immediately after being extracted from a larger message by the
adversary (via unpairing or decryption). Suppose the message came from
a deconstructive adversary node. Then there must be a proper path back
to a regular node, with nothing but deconstructive adversary nodes in be-
tween. The reason is that while tracing the path backwards, you could never
encounter a constructive node, because that would violate the normality
condition, so you must encounter only deconstructive nodes until you find a
regular node. Thus every reception node must be linked to a constructive
or regular node, or it must be the end of a chain that began with a regular
node. This conclusion is expressed by the following formula, which we will
call the chain formula,
Recv(r, mr) =>
Exists n. Link(n, r) & Constructive(n)
| Exists s, ms. Regular(s) & Send(s, ms) & Chain(s, r)
Here Recv(n,m) means that n is a reception node with msg(n) = m. And
Link(n1, n2) means that n1 → n2.
To be certain that it is safe to replace the link formula with the chain
formula, we will prove that they are logically equivalent. We will make two
assumptions: first, we will assume normality, and second, we will assume that
every node has a finite number of predecessors. While the latter assumption
is true of infiltrated skeletons - which are by definition finite - it might not be
true of all models - which may be infinite. In practice, a protocol execution
in which a node has an infinite number of predecessors is unrealistic. But by
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the compactness theorem, we cannot hope to write a theory which excludes
these infinite models.
Lemma 7. If n is a deconstructive reception node with a finite number of
inbound predecessors, then there is a regular node n′ such that Chain(n′, n).
Proof. We will induct on the number of inbound predecessors of n (an in-
bound predecessor of n is a reception node n′ such that n′ ≤ n). Say that
n has p inbound predecessors. Since n is deconstructive, it is part of either
an unpairing or a decryption strand, so there is a node n′ and message mn′
such that n′ ⇒+ n and Recv(n′,mn′). Since Recv(n′,mn′), there is a node q
such that Link(q, n′). Consider the type of q,
1. If q is constructive, then normality is violated.
2. If q is regular, we also know that Regular(q) and Chain(q, n), so we
are done.
3. If q is deconstructive, then it has at most p − 1 inbound predeces-
sors. By the inductive hypothesis, there is a regular node s such that
Chain(s, q). Thus Regular(s) and Chain(s, n) hold, so we are done.
Theorem 4. The link formula and the chain formula are equivalent in models
in which every node has a finite number of inbound predecessors.
Proof. (Forward) Assume that the chain formula holds. Now suppose that
Recv(r,mr). By the chain formula, either
1. there is a constructive node n such that n→ r, or
2. there is a chain from s to r.
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In the latter case, the existence of a path s, n1, ...nk, r implies that nk → r.
Either way, ∃n.n → r. Thus the formula Recv(n,m) ⇒ ∃n′.Link(n′, n)
holds.
(Reverse) Assume that the link formula holds. Now suppose thatRecv(r,mr).
We would like to show that one of the disjuncts of the chain formula holds.
Then ∃n.Link(n, r) and Send(n,mr). n must be constructive, deconstruc-
tive, or regular.
1. If n is constructive, then Constructive(n) holds and we are done.
2. If n is regular, then Chain(n, r) holds and we are done.
3. Otherwise, n is deconstructive. By the above lemma, there is a regular
node s such that Chain(s, n). Since n is deconstructive, we also have
Chain(s, r), and we are done.
The static theory, including the efficiency and chaining conditions, can
be found in appendix C.
3.4 The Functor FPrep
We will now give evidence toward the correctness theorem. First, we will
define a functor Frep from all possible infiltrated skeletons to all finite models
of our static theory, and argue that Frep is full, faithful, and invertible. We
call it Frep because given any infiltrated skeleton s, it gives the representation
of s as a model. Next we will explain how to augment Frep to act on skeletons
of any given protocol P , and argue for its correctness in the particular case
of Needham-Schroeder.
Let S be the category whose objects are infiltrated skeletons of all possible
protocols and whose morphisms are the homomorphisms between those skele-
tons. Likewise, let M be the category whose objects are the finite models
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of our static theory, and whose morphisms are the homomorphisms between
these models. Frep is a functor from S to M. This means it maps skeletons
to models and skeleton homomorphisms to model homomorphisms. Let us
first specify how Frep acts on skeletons.
Recall that an infiltrated skeleton is a tuple (N,→,≤, non, uniq) obeying
the axioms given in section 2.4.3. Let M be the set of all messages, and let
s = (N,→,≤, non, uniq) be any infiltrated skeleton in S. Then Frep(s) is a
model with domain N ∪M and the following relations,
Node(n)∀n ∈ N
Mesg(m)∀m ∈M
Send(n,m) iff dir(n) = + and msg(n) = m
Recv(n,m) iff dir(n) = − and msg(n) = m
NonOrig(m) iff m ∈ non
UniqOrig(m) iff m ∈ uniq
Link(n1, n2) iff n1 → n2
Precedes(n1, n2) iff n1 ≤ n2
Ingredient(x, y) iff x v y
Pair(x, y, z) iff z = (x, y)
Enc(x, y, z) iff z = {|x|}y
Basic(x) iff x is a basic message
Inverse(x, y) iff x = y−1
Parent(n1, n2) iff n1 ⇒ n2
E1(n) iff n is the first node of an adversarial encryption strand
E2(n) iff n is the second node of an adversarial encryption strand
E3(n) iff n is the third node of an adversarial encryption strand
... and so on for the other adversarial nodes
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where n, n1, n2 vary over the elements of N and m,x, y, z vary over the mes-
sages of M .
The behavior of Frep on homomorphisms is easy to describe. Recall that
a homomorphism on infiltrated skeletons is a pair (α, φ), where α is a homo-
morphism on messages, φ is a mapping from nodes to nodes, and α and φ
obey the axioms of section 2.4.4. We define Frep((α, φ)) = α ∪ φ.
3.4.1 Correctness of Frep
We will now argue that Frep is an invertible full and faithful functor.
Theorem 5. Frep is an invertible full and faithful functor from S to M.
Proof. There are four properties we must verify. Frep must be full, faithful,
a functor, and well-defined. Faithfullness is easy to verify. It says that if
(α1, φ1) 6= (α2, φ2) then α1 ∪φ1 6= α2 ∪φ2. This follows from the disjointness
of nodes and messages in the Strand Space formalism.
Assuming that Frep is well-defined, it is also easy to show that it is a
functor. This means that (i) it maps identity homomorphisms onto identity
homomorphisms, which it does because Frep((id, id)) = id∪id = id, and that
(ii) it maps the composition of homomorphisms onto the composition of their
images, which it does because Frep((α1, φ1) ◦ (α2, φ2)) = Frep((α1 ◦ α2, φ1 ◦
φ2)) = (α1◦α2)∪(φ1◦φ2) = (α1∪φ1)◦(α2∪φ2) = Frep((α1, φ1))◦Frep((α2, φ2)).
In order for Frep to be well-defined, it must map skeletons to models, and
it must map homomorphisms to homomorphisms. To see that Frep is well-
defined on skeletons, we need that for any skeleton s ∈ S, Frep(s) satisfies
the static theory. Likewise, for it to be invertible, we need that for any model
m ∈M , F−1rep(m) obeys the axioms of 2.4.3.
For example, consider the fourth axiom of 2.4.3, which states that ≤ is
a subset of the reflexive transitive closure of → ∪ ⇒. Verifying that this
axiom is satisfied involves showing that the formulas involving Precedes in
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the static theory guarentee that it includes the transitive closure of Link and
Parent.
We are left with the well-defined property for homomorphisms and the
fullness property. The well-defined property for homomorphisms says that if
(α, φ) is a skeleton homomorphism then α∪φ is a model homomorphism, and
the fullness property says that if α ∪ φ is a homomorphism then (α, φ) is a
homomorphism. Proving this is a matter of showing that each of the axioms
of 2.4.4 is implied by relations being preserved, and that the preservation
of each relation is implied by some axiom of 2.4.4. Additionally, message
homomorphisms must be examined in a similar fashion.
As an example, suppose that α ∪ φ : Frep(s1) → Frep(s2). Now consider
the first axiom of 2.4.4. It states that n1 ⇒ n2 implies φ(n1)⇒ φ(n2). This
axiom is satisfied, because if n1 ⇒ n2 in s1, then parent(n1, n2) in Frep(s1),
so parent(φ(n1), φ(n2)) in Frep(s2), so φ(n1)⇒ φ(n2) in s2.
Verifying the full correctness of Frep is a matter of examining the rest of
the axioms of 2.4.3 and 2.4.4 and the rest of the relations of appendix C, in
order to check that,
• S is an infiltrated skeleton iff Frep(S) is a model of the static theory
(Well-defined on skeletons and invertible).
• (α, φ) is a homomorphism on skeletons iff α ∪ φ is a homomorphisms
on models (Well-defined on homomorphisms and full).
3.4.2 Augmenting Frep
We will describe how to modify Frep to handle any particular protocol P . We
will call the modified functor FPrep; we would like that FPrep be an invertible
full and faithful functor from SP to MP . The theory TP contains two kinds
of relations not found in the static theory: (i) relations which say that a node
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is the nth node of a role in that protocol, and (ii) relations which say that a
message takes the place of a particular parameter in a role. Modifying Frep
to handle a given protocol involves only augmenting its behavior on skele-
tons to respect these relations. This is best understood by example; we will
consider the case of the Needham-Schroeder protocol from the perspective of
the initializer. We will call this protocol NS.
The dynamic portion of TNS is given in appendix B. It contains 14
relation symbols beyond those found in the static theory. Six of them, such
as init2 declare that a node is the nth node of a regular strand of a given
role. init2(n), for instance, means that n is the second node of an initiator
strand. The other eight relation symbols declare that a message takes the
place of a parameter in a role. n1 resp(n,m), for example, means that n
is a node in an instance of a responder strand, and the instance of the n1
parameter for that role is m.
We define FNSrep as follows,
• For any skeleton s of NS, FNSrep (s) is the model Frep(s) with the follow-
ing extra relations,
– a init(n,m) holds iff n ∈ N , m ∈ M , and m is the value of the
parameter a of the initiator role in the strand of n.
– b resp(n,m) holds iff n ∈ N , m ∈ M , and m is the value of the
parameter b of the responder role in the strand of n.
– init1(n) holds iff n ∈ N and n is the first node of an initiator
strand in s.
– init2(n) holds iff n ∈ N and n is the second node of an initiator
strand in s.
... and so on for the other 10 relations.
• For any skeleton homomorphism (α, φ) from one skeleton of NS to
another, FNSrep ((α, φ)) = Frep((α, φ)) = α ∪ φ.
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By the same argument as before, proving that FPrep is an invertible full
and faithful functor involves verifying that,
• S is an infiltrated skeleton of P iff FPrep(S) is a model of the TP .
• (α, φ) is a homomorphism on skeletons of P iff α∪φ is a homomorphisms
on models of TP .
For a skeleton to be a skeleton of NS, (i) it must satisfy the origination
assumptions of the initializer, (ii) it must contain at least one initializer
strand, and (iii) all of its regular nodes must be part of either intializer or
responder strands. The first two conditions are handled by the formula,
True -> Exists _n0, a, b, n1: name(a) & name(b)
& text(n1) & non-orig(Privk<b>) & non-orig(Privk<a>)
& uniq-orig(n1) & init3(_n0) & a_init(_n0, a)
& b_init(_n0, b) & n1_init(_n0, n1)
Here the origination assumptions are that A’s and B’s private keys are
nonoriginating, and that the message n1 is uniquely-originating. The atom
init3( n0) declares the existence of an initiator strand, and the atoms
b init( n0, b) and n1 init( n0, n1) tie the messages b and n1 to this strand.
For a strand s to be an instance of an initiator or responder role, there
must be a mapping ψ from the parameters of that role to messages under
which s is identical to an initial segment of that role, and the role’s origination
assumptions are satisfied. In this case, the roles of NS have no origination
assumptions. The mapping ψ is given by the relations a init, b init, ....
This mapping forces the messages of a strand to have the correct form by
formulas such as,
resp1(_n) & n1_resp(_n, n1) & a_resp(_n, a) & b_resp(_n, b)
-> recv(_n, Enc<Pair<n1, a>, Pubk<b>>)
Finally, the fact that a regular strand must appear to be an initial segment
of a strand is given by formulas such as,
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resp2(_n) -> Exists _m: Parent(_n, _m) & resp1(_m)
The formulas of the above form together state that whenever a node acts as
the n+ 1st node of a role for n ≥ 0, it has a parent that acts as the nth node
of that role. Formulas of the form,
b_resp(_n, _x) & Parent(_m, _n) -> b_resp(_m, _x)
then ensure that its parent shares the same parameters.
We end with the following theorem, which we believe to be true, and
which implies the correctness theorem 3,
Theorem 6. For any protocol P , FPrep witnesses the correctness of P .
3.5 A Chase Implementation
We were able to use our approach to analyze the Needham-Schroeder protocol
from the initializer’s (Alice’s) perspective, finding a single correct execution
as expected. At that point in time, we had not yet developed a protocol
compiler, so we expressed the protocol in geometric logic by hand. We used
an implementation of the Chase written by Michael Ficarra, a student at
WPI, for his Major Qualifying Project[8].
Two major stumbling blocks were the inefficiency and lack of support
for function symbols in Ficarra’s Chase implementation. This should not
be taken as criticism of his work. While the Chase algorithm itself is sim-
ple, efficiently implementing it is a difficult task. Implementing parts of
the algorithm in the obvious way, such as implementing formula satisfaction
testing by enumerating all possible environments, often leads to exponential




Future work could include improving the Chase, making the protocol com-
piler more practical to use, and integrating the compiler and the Chase into
a single tool. The Chase implementation could be improved by making it
fair (see 2.3.3), more efficient, and by adding support for function symbols.
Ideally, a user would be able to provide a protocol description, and receive
a list of possible executions in a human-readable format. Another useful
feature would be the ability to verify security properties on a protocol by
checking that they holds of all its executions. The only properties that we
know can be verified in this way are positive existential; whether there is a
usable way to verify a larger class of properties is an open question.





Considering a special case of protocol executions led to our discovery of the
following algorithm. In practice this class of executions turned out to be too
restrictive to be useful, but the algorithm stands on its own as a method of
testing isomorphism on single-inbound graphs.
4.1 Single-Inbound Graph Isomorphism Test-
ing
We will present an algorithm to test isomorphism between single-inbound
graphs. A directed graph is single-inbound if each of its vertices has in-degree
at most one. Our algorithm is an extension of the rooted tree isomorphism
testing algorithm by Aho, Hopcroft, and Ullman[1], which we will call the
AHU algorithm. It assumes that graphs are represented in such a way that
a vertex’s inbound edge can be discovered in constant time.
The algorithm has two stages. In the first stage, the components of the
graph are discovered, and in the second they are compared for isomorphism.
It can be shown that the components of a single-inbound graph are either
trees or unicyclic. This simplifies component discovery; applying a cycle-
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detection algorithm to the inbound path of an unexplored vertex will yield
either a cycle, which must be the center of a unicyclic component, or a vertex
with no inbound edge, which must be the root of a tree. This classification
of the components also simplifies isomorphism testing. The tree components
can be compared using the AHU algorithm, and we present an algorithm to
compare the unicyclic components in linear time.
Lemma 8. No component of a single-inbound graph can have more than one
cycle.
Proof. Suppose a component has two cycles, A and B. Select a vertex x that
is in A but not in B, and a vertex y that is in B but not A. Since x and
y are in the same component, there must be a path from one to the other.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that the path goes from x to y.
Now consider the first vertex in the path which lies on B. It must have two
inbound edges - one from B and one from the path. Thus, by contradiction,
no component can have more than one cycle.
We can conclude that the components of a single-inbound graph are either
rooted trees (zero cycles), or several trees whose roots are connected with a
cycle (one cycle).
4.1.1 Phase I - Component Discovery
The purpose of the first stage of the algorithm is to discover the components
of the graph. To begin, initialize three sets to be empty: a set of cycles C, a
set of tree roots R, and a set of explored vertices V . To retain linear time,
an implementation of sets with constant insertion and lookup time must be
used. Next, for each vertex v in the graph, if v is not currently in E,
• Add v to E.
• Run a cycle detection algorithm on the inbound path to v.
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• If a cycle is detected, add it to C.
• If, on the other hand, the inbound path terminates, add the terminal
vertex to R.
4.1.2 Phase II - Isomorphism Testing
Once the components of the graph have been discovered, its tree components
and the trees within its unicyclic components may be labeled in linear time
by the AHU algorithm. The only remaining challenge is to produce an or-
dering on the unicyclic components. We devised the following algorithm to
accomplish this task.
-- Compare cycles of the same length
compareCycles :: (Ord a) => Cycle a -> Cycle a -> Ordering
compareCycles (Cycle x) (Cycle y) =
let xlist = x ++ x
ylist = y ++ y in
loop (length x) xlist xlist ylist ylist
where
loop n l [] _ _ =
if length l >= n then EQ else GT
loop n _ _ l [] =
if length l >= n then EQ else LT
loop n xtail xhead ytail yhead =
case compare (head xhead) (head yhead) of
EQ -> loop n xtail (tail xhead) ytail (tail yhead)
LT -> loop n xtail xtail (tail yhead) (tail yhead)
GT -> loop n (tail xhead) (tail xhead) ytail ytail
Our algorithm takes as input two cycles of ordered elements, and com-
pares them cycle-lexicographically. A cycle of length n can be converted
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into a list in n different ways, by beginning the list with any element of the
cycle. For example, the cycle (1, 2, 1, 1, 2) can be converted to [1, 2, 1, 1, 2],
[2, 1, 1, 2, 1], [1, 1, 2, 1, 2], [1, 2, 1, 2, 1], or [2, 1, 2, 1, 1]. One such cycle will
be lexicographically least; in this case [1, 1, 2, 1, 2]. The cycle-lexicographic
ordering orders cycles by comparing their lexicographically least list repre-
sentations. Our algorithm performs this comparison in linear time.
4.1.3 Single-Inbound Edge-Colored Digraphs
One might wonder whether this approach can be easily extended to larger
classes of graphs. One possibility was the set of edge-colored digraphs in
which each vertex has at most one inbound edge of each color. We found,
however that this is not the case - even in the case of two colors, this problem
is as hard as general digraph isomorphism.
Let Uk be the set of edge-colored digraphs with the following two prop-
erties,
1. No vertex has two incoming edges of the same color.
2. There are at most k edge colors.
Theorem 7. The isomorphism problem for digraphs is polynomial-reducible
to the isomorphism problem for elements of U2.
Proof. We will give a translation ζ() from digraphs to U2 such that two
digraphs are isomorphic if and only if their images are. The image of a
digraph with v vertices and e edges will have e red edges, e green edges, and
v+ e vertices. Each vertex will be mapped to a vertex, and each edge will be
mapped to a new vertex along with two incoming edges: a green one from
the image of its source, and a red one from the image of its target.
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To be more precise, let D be any digraph. Then,
V (ζ(D)) = V (D) ∪ E(D)
Egreen(ζ(D)) = (x, (x, y)) : (x, y) ∈ E(D)
Ered(ζ(D)) = (y, (x, y)) : (x, y) ∈ E(D)
Now we must show that two digraphs are isomorphic if and only if their
images under ζ() are. It is clear that if two digraphs are isomorphic then
their images are. Now suppose that φ is an isomorphism between the images
of two digraphs D1 and D2. Let (x, y) be an edge of D1. Then
x→green (x, y)←red y in ζ(D1)
=⇒ φ(x)→green z ←red φ(y) in ζ(D2) (by the isomorphism property)
=⇒ φ(x)→green (φ(x), φ(y))←red φ(y) in ζ(D2)
=⇒ (φ(x), φ(y)) in D2 (by the definition of ζ())
By symmetry, φ preserves edges in both directions: from D1 to D2 and from
D2 to D1. Thus the restriction of φ onto the vertices of D1 is an isomorphism
between D1 and D2.
4.2 Isomorphism Complete Problems
While the models returned by the Chase are jointly universal, they might not
be minimal. There may be a homomorphism, or even an isomorphism, from
one Chase model to another. In such a case, we would prefer to eliminate
the less general model. Thus the question of the complexity of the homomor-
phism and isomorphism problems for relational structures naturally arises.
Each execution can be thought of in two equally valid ways. An execution
is a relational structure, since it was produced by the Chase running on a
geometric theory. But it is also an infiltrated skeleton in a strand space.
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Temporarily ignoring its messages and origination assumptions, its remaining
structure can be viewed as a directed acyclic graph of nodes. So we may also
ask about the complexity of the homomorphism and isomorphism problems
for DAGs.
We discovered that the complexities were the same from both perspec-
tives. In fact, for several graph-like structures - graphs, digraphs, DAGs,
edge-labeled digraphs, and relational structures - the homomorphism prob-
lems are all NP-complete while the isomorphism problems are isomorphism-
complete. We will use the word structure to refer generically to these graph-
like entities from now on.
The best known algorithms for solving NP-complete problems have expo-
nential running time. It is conjectured that they cannot be solved any faster;
this conjecture is one of the most important open problems in computer
science. Isomorphism-complete problems are defined as being equivalent in
complexity to the graph isomorphism problem. These problems have a sim-
ilar standing; the best known algorithm runs in O(N logN) time[6] (part of
the quasi-polynomial class), and it is thought, though unproven, that no
polynomial-time algorithm for them exists.
4.2.1 Structure Reductions
All of the aforementioned complexity results were known. Our contribution
in the area is an elegant and constructive way of demonstrating the equiva-
lence of the homomorphism and isomorphism problems of any two kinds of
structures. The general idea is to describe a function r of polynomial time
complexity that reduces structures of one kind to structures of another kind
in such a way that A → B iff r(A) → r(B) and A ↔ B iff r(A) ↔ r(B).
Homomorphism and isomorphism can then be tested simply by applying the
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r(B)
A→ B iff r(A)→ r(B)
If such a reduction exists, it can be concluded that the homomorphism
and isomorphism problems on the source structures are no harder than the
respective problems on the target structures. We have found a sufficient con-
dition for a reduction function to have this property. We call such functions
structure reductions. Besides being polynomial-time computable, structure
reductions have four properties. Roughly speaking, (1) They replace edges
in the graph they are given with more complex substructures, (2) they treat
similar edges similarly, (3) they are injective on the vertices of the structure
they are given, and (4) there is never any ambiguity about the preimage of
a substructure of the resulting structure. For simplicity, we will assume that
every vertex in a structure is incident with at least one edge; it should be
clear that this will not make the homomorphism and isomorphism problems
any easier.
Definition 5 (Structure Reduction). A structure reduction is a function
r :: S1 → S2 such that for all structures A,B ∈ S1 and edges e ∈ E(A),





h−→ r(B) then r−1(h(r(e))) ∈ E(B)
4. If A
h−→ B then there is a homomorphism φe such that
• r(e) φe−→ r(h(e))
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• For all v ∈ V (e), φ(r(v)) = r(h(v))
Theorem 8 (Preservation Theorem). If a function r :: S1 → S2 is a struc-
ture reduction, then for all A ∈ S1 and B ∈ S2,
• There is a homomorphism from A to B iff there is a homomorphism
from r(A) to r(B)
• Likewise for isomorphisms
Proof. (Forward) Suppose that A
h−→ B. Let h′ = ∪e∈E(A)φe. h′ is well defined
for the following reason: For any two edges e1, e2 ∈ E(A), if v ∈ V (r(e1)) and
v ∈ V (r(e2)) then v = r(w) for some w ∈ V (A). Thus φe1(v) = φe1(r(w)) =
r(h(w)) = φe2(r(w)) = φe2(v), and h
′ is well-defined. For any edge e ∈
E(r(A)), e ⊆ r(e′) for some e′ ∈ E(A). Thus h′(e) = φe′(e) ∈ E(r(B)).
Since h′ preserves edges, r(A) h
′−→ r(B).
(Reverse) Suppose that r(A)
h−→ r(B). Let h′ :: V (A) → V (B), h′ =
r−1 ◦ h ◦ r. h′ is well-defined because r is bijective on V (B). For any edge
e ∈ E(A), h(r(e)) = r(e′) for some e′ ∈ E(B). Thus h′(e) = r−1(h(r(e))) =
r−1(r(e′)) = e′ ∈ E(B). Since h′ preserves edges, A h′−→ B.
(Isomorphisms) Notice that in the above two cases, if h is bijective, then
h′ will also be bijective. Thus A↔ B iff r(A)↔ r(B).
We conjecture that structure reductions also preserve substructure-isomorphisms.
4.2.2 Examples
Some examples are in order. Each of the following is a structure reduc-
tion. Together, they show the equivalence of the homomorphism problems
and of the isomorphism problems on graphs, digraphs, DAGs, edge-labeled
digraphs, and relational structures.
Graph → Digraph Replace each undirected edge
•x •y
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with two directed edges
•x **jj •y
Digraph → Graph Replace each edge
•x // •y












•x • G •y
where G is the center vertex of a Grotzsch Graph. This reduction relies
on the fact the the triangle and the Grotzsch Graph form an antichain;
there is no homomorphism from the triangle to G because G is triangle-
free, and there is no homomorphism from G to the triangle because G
is not three-colorable.
Digraph → DAG Replace each edge
•x // •y
with
•x •oo •oo //ww • // • // •y
DAG → Digraph The identity function
Digraph → Edge-labelled Digraph Just label each edge with a ’0’.
Edge-labelled Digraph → Digraph 1. Convert the labels into binary
sequences all of the same length. For instance, red, green, blue
may become 00, 01, 10.
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2. Now translate an edge, say
•x ′010′ // •y














By Cn we mean a vertex of the digraph cycle of length n. Here C3
denotes the digit ’0’, C5 denotes the digit 1, and C7 denotes the
end of the binary sequence. This reduction relies on the fact that
the prime-numbered cycles, C2, C3, C5, C7, ... form an antichain.
Edge-labelled Digraph → Relational Structure
•x l // •y l(x, y)
54
Relational Structure → Edge-labelled Digraph
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;;; This protocol definition is from the CPSA distribution
(herald "Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol"
(comment "This protocol contains a man-in-the-middle"
"attack discovered by Galvin Lowe."))
(defprotocol ns basic
(defrole init
(vars (a b name) (n1 n2 text))
(trace
(send (enc n1 a (pubk b)))
(recv (enc n1 n2 (pubk a)))
(send (enc n2 (pubk b)))))
(defrole resp
(vars (b a name) (n2 n1 text))
(trace
(recv (enc n1 a (pubk b)))
(send (enc n1 n2 (pubk a)))
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(recv (enc n2 (pubk b)))))
(comment "Needham-Schroeder"))
;;; The initiator point-of-view
(defskeleton ns
(vars (a b name) (n1 text))
(defstrand init 3 (a a) (b b) (n1 n1))
(non-orig (privk b) (privk a))
(uniq-orig n1)
(comment "Initiator point-of-view"))
;;; The responder point-of-view
(defskeleton ns
(vars (a name) (n2 text))








The dynamic portion of the theory for the Needham-Schroeder protocol, from the
initiator’s perspective, as output by our compiler:
a_init(_n, _x) -> Node(_n) & name(_x)
a_init(_n, _x) & a_init(_n, _y) -> _x = _y
a_init(_n, _x) & Parent(_m, _n) -> a_init(_m, _x)
b_init(_n, _x) -> Node(_n) & name(_x)
b_init(_n, _x) & b_init(_n, _y) -> _x = _y
b_init(_n, _x) & Parent(_m, _n) -> b_init(_m, _x)
n1_init(_n, _x) -> Node(_n) & text(_x)
n1_init(_n, _x) & n1_init(_n, _y) -> _x = _y
n1_init(_n, _x) & Parent(_m, _n) -> n1_init(_m, _x)
n2_init(_n, _x) -> Node(_n) & text(_x)
n2_init(_n, _x) & n2_init(_n, _y) -> _x = _y
n2_init(_n, _x) & Parent(_m, _n) -> n2_init(_m, _x)
init1(_n) & n1_init(_n, n1) & a_init(_n, a)
& b_init(_n, b) -> send(_n, Enc<Pair<n1, a>, Pubk<b>>)
init1(_n) -> Exists n1, a, b: n1_init(_n, n1)
& a_init(_n, a) & b_init(_n, b)
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init2(_n) & n1_init(_n, n1) & n2_init(_n, n2)
& a_init(_n, a) -> recv(_n, Enc<Pair<n1, n2>, Pubk<a>>)
init2(_n) -> Exists _m: Parent(_n, _m) & init1(_m)
init2(_n) -> Exists n1, n2, a: n1_init(_n, n1)
& n2_init(_n, n2) & a_init(_n, a)
init3(_n) & n2_init(_n, n2) & b_init(_n, b)
-> send(_n, Enc<n2, Pubk<b>>)
init3(_n) -> Exists _m: Parent(_n, _m) & init2(_m)
init3(_n) -> Exists n2, b: n2_init(_n, n2) & b_init(_n, b)
a_resp(_n, _x) -> Node(_n) & name(_x)
a_resp(_n, _x) & a_resp(_n, _y) -> _x = _y
a_resp(_n, _x) & Parent(_m, _n) -> a_resp(_m, _x)
b_resp(_n, _x) -> Node(_n) & name(_x)
b_resp(_n, _x) & b_resp(_n, _y) -> _x = _y
b_resp(_n, _x) & Parent(_m, _n) -> b_resp(_m, _x)
n1_resp(_n, _x) -> Node(_n) & text(_x)
n1_resp(_n, _x) & n1_resp(_n, _y) -> _x = _y
n1_resp(_n, _x) & Parent(_m, _n) -> n1_resp(_m, _x)
n2_resp(_n, _x) -> Node(_n) & text(_x)
n2_resp(_n, _x) & n2_resp(_n, _y) -> _x = _y
n2_resp(_n, _x) & Parent(_m, _n) -> n2_resp(_m, _x)
resp1(_n) & n1_resp(_n, n1) & a_resp(_n, a)
& b_resp(_n, b) -> recv(_n, Enc<Pair<n1, a>, Pubk<b>>)
resp1(_n) -> Exists n1, a, b: n1_resp(_n, n1)
& a_resp(_n, a) & b_resp(_n, b)
resp2(_n) & n1_resp(_n, n1) & n2_resp(_n, n2)
& a_resp(_n, a) -> send(_n, Enc<Pair<n1, n2>, Pubk<a>>)
resp2(_n) -> Exists _m: Parent(_n, _m) & resp1(_m)
resp2(_n) -> Exists n1, n2, a: n1_resp(_n, n1)
& n2_resp(_n, n2) & a_resp(_n, a)
resp3(_n) & n2_resp(_n, n2) & b_resp(_n, b)
-> recv(_n, Enc<n2, Pubk<b>>)
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resp3(_n) -> Exists _m: Parent(_n, _m) & resp2(_m)
resp3(_n) -> Exists n2, b: n2_resp(_n, n2) & b_resp(_n, b)
True -> Exists _n0, a, b, n1: name(a) & name(b)
& text(n1) & non-orig(Privk<b>) & non-orig(Privk<a>)
& uniq-orig(n1) & init3(_n0) & a_init(_n0, a)
& b_init(_n0, b) & n1_init(_n0, n1)
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Appendix C








# Every Term specified in the protocol must *explicitly* be
# a Concatenation, Encryption, or Basic Term;
# Term Origination is not inferred, but should be written
# with the protocol rules;
# Is ’Precedes’ necessary in the AdvDeConstructed rule?




Mesg(x) & Node(x) ->;
# Send, Recv #
Send(n, t) -> Node(n) & Mesg(t);
Recv(n, t) -> Node(n) & Mesg(t);
Node(n) -> Exists t: Send(n, t)
| Exists t: Recv(n, t);
Send(n, s) & Send(n, t) -> s = t;
Recv(n, s) & Recv(n, t) -> s = t;
Send(n, s) & Recv(n, t) -> false;
# Inverse #
Inverse(k, k’) -> Mesg(k) & Mesg(k’) & Inverse(k’, k);
Inverse(k, k1) & Inverse(k, k2) -> k1 = k2;




Pair(g, h, t) -> Mesg(g) & Mesg(h) & Mesg(t);
Pair(g, h, s) & Pair(g, h, t) -> s = t;
Pair(G1, h1, t) & Pair(g2, h2, t) -> G1 = g2 & h1 = h2;
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# Enc #
Enc(g, k, t) -> Mesg(g) & Mesg(k) & Mesg(t);
Enc(g, k, s) & Enc(g, k, t) -> s = t;
Enc(G1, k1, t) & Enc(g2, k2, t) -> G1 = g2 & k1 = k2;
# Disjointness of Types #
Basic(t) & Enc(g, k, t) ->;
Basic(t) & Pair(g, h, t) ->;
Enc(g, k, t) & Pair(u, v, t) ->;
# Link (->) #
Link(n, m) -> Exists t : Send(n, t) & Recv(m, t);
Link(n, m) & Link(p, m) -> n = p; # Broadcast semantics;
# Parent (=>) #
Parent(n, m) -> Node(n) & Node(m);
Parent(n, m) & Parent(n, p) -> m = p;
Parent(n, m) & Parent(p, m) -> n = p;
# Uniquely Originating #








Parent(n, m) -> Precedes(n, m);
Link(n, m, t) -> Precedes(n, m);
Precedes(n, m) & Precedes(m, p) -> Precedes(n, p);
# Ingredient #
Mesg(t) -> Ingredient(t, t);
Pair(g, h, s) & Ingredient(s, t) ->
Ingredient(g, t) & Ingredient(h, t);
Enc(g, k, s) & Ingredient(s, t) -> Ingredient(g, t);
#####################
### Pruning Rules ###
#####################
# Non-Origination #
NonOrig(t) & Orig(t, n) ->;
# Shortcut for NonOrigination #
NonOrig(t) & Ingredient(t, s) & Send(n, s) ->;







# ThreeStrand(n1, n2, n3) states that nodes n1, n2, and n3 form a
# strand with precisely three nodes, in that order.
ThreeStrand(n1, n2, n3) & Parent(x, n1) ->;
ThreeStrand(n1, n2, n3) & Parent(n3, x) ->;
ThreeStrand(n1, n2, n3) ->
Parent(n1, n2) & Parent(n2, n3) &
Advesary(n1) & Advesary(n2) & Advesary(n3);
# Generation #
G1(n, t) & Parent(x, n) ->;
G1(n, t) & Parent(n, x) ->;
G1(n, t) -> Send(n, t) & Basic(t) & Orig(t, n) & Advesary(n);
# Pairenation #
C1(n1, g, h) -> Exists n2, n3 :
C2(n2, g, h) & C3(n3, g, h) & ThreeStrand(n1, n2, n3);
C2(n2, g, h) -> Exists n1, n3 :
C1(n1, g, h) & C3(n3, g, h) & ThreeStrand(n1, n2, n3);
C3(n3, g, h) -> Exists n1, n2 :
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C1(n1, g, h) & C2(n2, g, h) & ThreeStrand(n1, n2, n3);
C1(n1, g, h) -> Recv(n1, g);
C2(n2, g, h) -> Recv(n2, h);
C3(n3, g, h) -> Exists t :
Pair(g, h, t) & Send(n3, t) & Orig(t, n3);
# Encryption #
E1(n1, g, k) -> Exists n2, n3:
E2(n2, g, k) & E3(n3, g, k) & ThreeStrand(n1, n2, n3);
E2(n2, g, k) -> Exists n1, n3:
E1(n1, g, k) & E3(n3, g, k) & ThreeStrand(n1, n2, n3);
E3(n3, g, k) -> Exists n1, n2:
E1(n1, g, k) & E2(n2, g, k) & ThreeStrand(n1, n2, n3);
E1(n1, g, k) -> Recv(n1, g);
E2(n2, g, k) -> Recv(n2, k);
E3(n3, g, k) -> Exists t:
Enc(g, k, t) & Send(n3, t) & Orig(t, n3);
# Unpairing #
U1(n1, g, h) -> Exists n2, n3:
U2(n2, g, h) & U3(n3, g, h) & ThreeStrand(n1, n2, n3);
U2(n2, g, h) -> Exists n1, n3:
U1(n1, g, h) & U3(n3, g, h) & ThreeStrand(n1, n2, n3);
U3(n3, g, h) -> Exists n1, n2:
U1(n1, g, h) & U2(n2, g, h) & ThreeStrand(n1, n2, n3);
U1(n1, g, h) -> Exists t:
Pair(g, h, t) & Recv(n1, t);
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U2(n2, g, h) -> Send(n2, g);
U3(n3, g, h) -> Send(n3, h);
# Decryption #
D1(n1, g, k) -> Exists n2, n3:
D2(n2, g, k) & D3(n3, g, k) & ThreeStrand(n1, n2, n3);
D2(n2, g, k) -> Exists n1, n3:
D1(n1, g, k) & D3(n3, g, k) & ThreeStrand(n1, n2, n3);
D3(n3, g, k) -> Exists n1, n2:
D1(n1, g, k) & D2(n2, g, k) & ThreeStrand(n1, n2, n3);
D1(n1, g, k) -> Exists t:
Enc(g, k, t) & Recv(n1, t);
D2(n2, g, k) -> Exists k’:
Inv(k, k’) & Recv(n2, k’);




# Chain rule must come first!
# There is a Chain from m->s to r<-t;
Chain(m, s, r, t) ->
Link(m, r)
| AdvUnpairLeft(m, s, r, t)
| AdvUnpairRight(m, s, r, t)
| AdvDecrypt(m, s, r, t);
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AdvUnpairLeft(m, s, r, t) -> Exists x, y, n1, n2, n3:
Pair(x, y, s) & U1(n1, x, y) & U2(n2, x, y) & U3(n3, x, y) &
Link(m, n1) & Chain(n2, x, r, t);
AdvUnpairRight(m, s, r, t) -> Exists x, y, n1, n2, n3:
Pair(x, y, s) & U1(n1, x, y) & U2(n2, x, y) & U3(n3, x, y) &
Link(m, n1) & Chain(n3, y, r, t);
AdvDecrypt(m, s, r, t) -> Exists g, k, n1, n2, n3:
Enc(g, k, s) & D1(n1, g, k) & D2(n2, g, k) & D3(n3, g, k) &
Link(m, n1) & Chain(n3, g, r, t);
Recv(n, t) -> Constructed(t, n);






AdvGenerated(t, r) -> Exists n:
G1(n, t) & Link(n, r);
AdvConcatenated(t, r) -> Exists g, h, n:
Pair(g, h, t) & C3(n, g, h) & Link(n, r);
AdvEncrypted(t, r) -> Exists g, k, n:
Enc(g, k, t) & E3(n, g, k) & Link(n, r);
AdvDeConstructed(t, r) -> Exists m, s:
Regular(m) & Send(m, s) & Precedes(m, r) &
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THEORY OF LIABILITY , WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY , OR TORT
(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
−}
import Data . Char
import Data . L i s t
import Control .Monad
import Control .Monad . State
import System . IO
import q u a l i f i e d Data . Set as Set
import q u a l i f i e d Data .Map as Map
import SExpr
import Debug . Trace
{−
Usage :
Take a CPSA−s t y l e p ro to co l d e f i n i t i o n , and compile i t i n to a
geometr ic l o g i c theory .
> cat prot . scm | . / compi le r > prot . g l t
Overview :
The t r a n s l a t i o n p i p e l i n e i s as f o l l ow s :
S t r ing −−−−> SExpr −−−−> Protoco l −−−−> Theory −−−−> St r ing
read compi le t r a n s l a t e show , format
I f you want to change the output formatt ing ( to make use of , say ,
another implementation o f the chase ) , s e e the Formatting code . The
chase implementation should be ab le to handle v a r i a b l e names with
whatever cha ra c t e r s are used in v a r i a b l e s in the p ro to co l
d e f i n i t i o n .
L imi ta t i ons :
Needs a formula ” r e gu l a r (n) => i n i t 1 (n) | . . . ” .
I n t e r s p e r s ed comments cause parse e r r o r .
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Syntax e r r o r s w i l l be shown as incomplete pat t e rns .
Protoco l a lgor i thm ignored .
Do not support l a b e l s .
Do not support node pa i r s .
Terminology :
i n i t 0 (n) & i n i t x (n , x ) −> send (n , pa i r (x , x ) )
’ i n i t ’ p r i n c i p a l ( pr inc )
’0 ’ index
’n ’ node
’x ’ parameter (param)
’ pa i r (x , x ) ’ mesg
’ i n i t 0 ’ node r e l a t i o n
’ i n i t 0 (n ) ’ node atom
’ i n i t x ’ parameter r e l a t i o n
’ i n i t x (n , x ) ’ parameter atom
’ send ’ event r e l a t i o n
’ send (n , x ) ’ send atom
−}
{− Protoco l −}
type Var = St r ing
type Sort = St r ing
data Mesg = Simple Var
| Compound St r ing [Mesg ]
type D i r e c t i on = St r ing
data Event = Event D i r e c t i on Mesg
type Trace = [ Event ]
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type Pred i cate = St r ing
type HTMesg = ( Int , Mesg )
data Assumption = Assumption Pred i cate HTMesg
data SkelAssum = SkelAssum Pred i cate Mesg
data Precedes = Precedes ( Int , Int ) ( Int , Int )
data Role = Role S t r ing (Map.Map Var Sort ) Trace [ Assumption ]
type Node = ( Princ , Int )
type Maplet = (Var , Mesg )
data Strand = Strand Node [ Maplet ]
| L i s t en e r Mesg
data Form = Protoco l S t r ing [ Role ]
| Ske le ton (Map.Map Var Sort ) [ Strand ] [ SkelAssum ]
[ Precedes ]
{− Main −}
readSExprs : : Handle −> IO [ SExpr Pos ]
readSExprs handle = do
pos <− posHandle ”” handle
loop pos
where
loop pos = do
sexpr <− load pos
case sexpr o f
Nothing −> re turn [ ]
Just expr −> do
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exprs <− loop pos
re turn ( expr : exprs )
testShowTheory = putStrLn $ show $ Theory ” theory ”
[ Rule
[ Re lat ion ”R” [ term x ] ]
( Ex i s t s [ ” y” , ”z ” ]
[ Re lat ion ”P”
[ term x ,
Function ” f ” [ term x , Var iab le ”y ” ] ] ,
Equation
( Function ”g” [ term x ] )
( Function ”g” [ Var iab le ”z ” ] ) ] ) ]
main = do
exprs <− readSExprs s td in
putStrLn $ show $ t r a n s l a t e ”” $ compile exprs
{− Compilation −}
compi le : : [ SExpr a ] −> [ Form ]
compi le [ ] = [ ] −− ’ sequence ’ ought j u s t i gno re Nothings . . .
compi le ( form : forms ) = case compileForm form o f
Nothing −> compi le forms
Just r e s u l t −> r e s u l t : compi le forms
compileForm : : SExpr a −> Maybe Form
compileForm expr @ (L (S head : body ) ) = case head o f
” d e f p r o t o c o l ” −> Just $ compi l eProtoco l expr
” d e f s k e l e t on ” −> Just $ compi l eSke le ton expr
” hera ld ” −> Nothing
”comment” −> Nothing
compi l eProtoco l : : SExpr a −> Form
compi l eProtoco l (L (S
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” de f p r o t o c o l ” : S id : : r e s t ) ) =
l e t ( r o l e s , a l i s t ) = pa r t i t i o n i sRo l e r e s t in
Protoco l id (map compi leRole r o l e s )
where
i sRo l e (L (S ” d e f r o l e ” : ) ) = True
i sRo l e = False
compi leRole : : SExpr a −> Role
compi leRole (L (S
” d e f r o l e ” : S id : vars : t r a c e : assumptions ) ) =
Role id ( compileVars vars ) ( compileTrace t r a c e )
( concatMap compileAssumption assumptions )
compileVars : : SExpr a −> Map.Map Var Sort
compileVars (L (S ” vars ” : vars ) ) =
Map. unions $ map compi leDecl vars
compi leDecl : : SExpr a −> Map.Map Var Sort
compi leDecl (L dec l ) =
l e t s o r t = case l a s t dec l o f S s −> s
vars = map compileVar ( i n i t de c l ) in
Map. f romList ( z ip vars ( repeat s o r t ) )
compileVar : : SExpr a −> Var
compileVar (S var ) = var
compileTrace : : SExpr a −> Trace
compileTrace (L (S ” t r a c e ” : events ) ) =
map compileEvent events
compileEvent : : SExpr a −> Event
compileEvent (L [ S d i r e c t i on , mesg ] ) =
Event d i r e c t i o n ( compileMesg mesg )
compileAssumption : : SExpr a −> [ Assumption ]
compileAssumption (L (S ”comment” : ) ) = [ ]
compileAssumption (L (S pred : mesgs ) ) =
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map (Assumption pred . compileHTMesg ) mesgs
compileHTMesg : : SExpr a −> HTMesg
compileHTMesg (L [N index , mesg ] ) =
( index , compileMesg mesg )
compileHTMesg expr = (1 , compileMesg expr )
compileMesg : : SExpr a −> Mesg
compileMesg (S id ) = Simple id
compileMesg (L (S head : body ) ) =
Compound head (map compileMesg body )
compileMesg (N x) = e r r o r $ show x
compileMesg (Q x) = e r r o r x
compi l eSke le ton : : SExpr a −> Form
compi l eSke le ton (L (S
” de f s k e l e t on ” : S id : vars : r e s t ) ) =
l e t ( strands , a l i s t ) = pa r t i t i o n i sS t rand r e s t
( precs , assums ) = pa r t i t i o n i sPr e c a l i s t in
Ske le ton ( compileVars vars ) (map compileStrand st rands )
( concatMap compileSkelAssum assums )
( concatMap compi lePrec prec s )
where
i sS t rand (L (S ” de f s t rand ” : ) ) = True
i sS t rand = False
i sP r e c (L (S ” precedes ” : ) ) = True
i sPr e c = False
compileSkelAssum : : SExpr a −> [ SkelAssum ]
compileSkelAssum (L (S ”comment” : ) ) = [ ]
compileSkelAssum (L (S pred : mesgs ) ) =
map (\ ( p , m) −> SkelAssum p m) $
z ip ( repeat pred ) (map compileMesg mesgs )
compi lePrec : : SExpr a −> [ Precedes ]
compi lePrec (L (S ” precedes ” : prec s ) ) =
map compileNodePair prec s
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compileNodePair : : SExpr a −> Precedes
compileNodePair (L [L [N x1 , N x2 ] ,
L [N y1 , N y2 ] ] ) =
Precedes ( x1 , x2 ) ( y1 , y2 )
compi leStrand : : SExpr a −> Strand
compi leStrand (L [ S ” d e f l i s t e n e r ” , mesg ] ) =
L i s t en e r $ compileMesg mesg
compi leStrand (L (S
” de f s t rand ” : S id : N s i z e : maplets ) ) =
Strand ( id , s i z e ) (map compileMaplet maplets )
compileMaplet : : SExpr a −> Maplet
compileMaplet (L [ l e f t , r i g h t ] ) =
( compileVar l e f t , compileMesg r i gh t )
{− Theory −}
type Rel = St r ing −− r e l a t i o n symbol
type Fun = Str ing
type Princ = St r ing
type Param = Str ing
data Term = Var iab le Var
| Function Fun [Term ]
data Atom = Relat ion Rel [ Term ]
| Equation Term Term
atom r e l vars = Relat ion r e l (map Var iab le vars )
type Conjunction = [Atom ]
data Ex i s t e n t i a l = Ex i s t s [ Var ] Conjunction
−− Assuming that d i s j u n c t i o n s aren ’ t nece s sa ry .
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data Rule = Rule Conjunction Ex i s t e n t i a l
data Theory = Theory St r ing [ Rule ]
f r e eVar s : : Term −> [ Var ]
f r e eVar s ( Var iab le var ) = [ var ]
f r e eVar s ( Function subterms ) =
nub $ concatMap f r eeVar s subterms
{− Trans la t i on −}
t r a n s l a t e : : S t r ing −> [ Form ] −> Theory
t r a n s l a t e name forms =
Theory name $ concatMap trans lateForm forms
trans lateForm : : Form −> [ Rule ]
trans lateForm protocol@ ( Protoco l ) =
t r an s l a t eP r o t o c o l p ro to co l
trans lateForm skeleton@ ( Ske le ton ) =
[ t r an s l a t e Sk e l e t on sk e l e t on ]
{− Protoco l Trans la t i on −}
t r an s l a t eP r o t o c o l : : Form −> [ Rule ]
t r an s l a t eP r o t o c o l ( Protoco l names r o l e s ) =
concatMap t r an s l a t eRo l e r o l e s
t r an s l a t eRo l e : : Role −> [ Rule ]
t r an s l a t eRo l e ( Role name vars t r a c e assumptions ) =
l e t varRules = Map. elems $
Map.mapWithKey ( t rans l a t eVar name) vars
t raceRu le s = zipWith ( t rans l a t eEvent name)
t r a c e [ 1 . . ]
assumRules = map ( trans lateAssumpt ion name)
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assumptions in
concat ( varRules ++ traceRu le s ++ assumRules )
t rans l a t eVar : : S t r ing −> Var −> Sort −> [ Rule ]
t rans l a t eVar pr inc var s o r t =
[ paramSortRule pr inc var sort ,
paramFuncRule pr inc var ,
paramParentRule pr inc var ]
t rans l a t eEvent : : S t r ing −> Event −> Int −> [ Rule ]
t rans l a t eEvent pr inc event index =
l e t ru l e 1 = eventRule ( pr inc , index ) event
ru l e 2 = eventParentRule ( pr inc , index )
ru l e 3 = eventParamRule ( pr inc , index ) event in
case ru l e 2 o f
Nothing −> [ ru le1 , ru l e 3 ]
Just r u l e −> [ ru le1 , ru le , ru l e 3 ]
t rans lateAssumpt ion : : S t r ing −> Assumption −> [ Rule ]
t rans lateAssumpt ion pr inc ( Assumption pred ( index , mesg ) ) =
[ assumptionRule ( pr inc , index ) pred
( t rans lateMesg id mesg ) ]
t rans lateMesg : : (Var −> St r ing ) −> Mesg −> Term
trans lateMesg namer ( Simple var ) =
Var iab le ( namer var )
t rans lateMesg namer (Compound ”pubk” [ Simple var ] ) =
Function ”Pubk” [ Var iab le $ namer var ]
t rans lateMesg namer (Compound ” pr ivk ” [ Simple var ] ) =
Function ”Privk ” [ Var iab le $ namer var ]
t rans lateMesg namer (Compound ” invk ” [ Simple var ] ) =
Function ” Invk” [ Var iab le $ namer var ]
t rans lateMesg namer
(Compound ” l t k ” [ Simple var1 , Simple var2 ] ) =
Function ”Ltk” [ Var iab le $ namer var1 ,
Var iab le $ namer var2 ]
t rans lateMesg namer (Compound ” cat ” [ x , y ] ) =
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Function ”Pair ” (map ( trans lateMesg namer ) [ x , y ] )
−− Ensure that Cats and Encs have exac t l y two subterms .
t rans lateMesg namer (Compound ” cat ” (x : y : ys ) ) =
Function ”Pair ”
[ t rans lateMesg namer x ,
t rans lateMesg namer (Compound ” cat ” (y : ys ) ) ]
t rans lateMesg namer (Compound ”enc” [ p l a in t ex t , key ] ) =
Function ”Enc” (map ( trans lateMesg namer )
[ p l a in t ex t , key ] )
t rans lateMesg namer (Compound ”enc” subterms )
| l ength subterms >= 3 =
Function ”Enc” [ t rans lateMesg namer
(Compound ” cat ” ( i n i t subterms ) ) ,
t rans lateMesg namer ( l a s t subterms ) ]
{− Rules −}
−− ” i n i t 1 (n) & b i n i t (n , b) −> non−o r i g ( Privk<b>)”
assumptionRule : : Node −> Pred i ca te −> Term −> Rule
assumptionRule ( pr inc , index ) pred term =
l e t vars = f r eeVar s term in
Rule (nodeAtom ( princ , index ) term n :
paramConj pr inc term n
( z ip vars (map Var iab le vars ) ) )
( Ex i s t s [ ] [ assumAtom pred term ] )
−− ” i n i t 1 (n) & a i n i t (n , a ) & n1 i n i t (n , n1 )
−− −> send (n , Enc<n1 , Pubk<a>>)”
eventRule : : Node −> Event −> Rule
eventRule ( pr inc , index ) ( Event d i r mesg ) =
l e t term = trans lateMesg id mesg
params = f reeVar s term in
Rule (nodeAtom ( princ , index ) term n :
paramConj pr inc term n
( z ip params (map Var iab le params ) ) )
( Ex i s t s [ ] [ eventAtom d i r term n term ] )
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−− ” i n i t 2 (n) −> Ex i s t s m: Parent (m, n) & i n i t 1 (m)”
eventParentRule : : Node −> Maybe Rule
eventParentRule ( pr inc , 1) = Nothing
eventParentRule ( pr inc , index ) = Just $
Rule [ nodeAtom ( princ , index ) term n ]
( Ex i s t s [ var m ] [ parentAtom term m term n ,
nodeAtom ( princ , index − 1) term m ] )
−− ” i n i t 1 (n) −> Ex i s t s a , n1 : a i n i t (n , a ) & n1 i n i t (n , n1 )”
eventParamRule : : Node −> Event −> Rule
eventParamRule ( pr inc , index ) ( Event pred mesg ) =
l e t vars = f r eeVar s ( t rans lateMesg id mesg ) in
Rule [ nodeAtom ( princ , index ) term n ]
( Ex i s t s vars ( paramConj pr inc term n
( z ip vars (map Var iab le vars ) ) ) )
−− ” a i n i t (n , x ) −> Node (n) & name(x )”
paramSortRule : : Princ −> Param −> Sort −> Rule
paramSortRule pr inc param so r t =
Rule [ paramAtom pr inc param [ term n , term x ] ]
( Ex i s t s [ ] [ sortAtom ”Node” term n ,
sortAtom so r t term x ] )
−− ” a i n i t (n , x ) & a i n i t (n , y ) −> x = y”
paramFuncRule : : Pr inc −> Param −> Rule
paramFuncRule pr inc param =
Rule [ paramAtom pr inc param [ term n , term x ] ,
paramAtom pr inc param [ term n , term y ] ]
( Ex i s t s [ ] [ Equation term x term y ] )
−− ” a i n i t (n , x ) & Parent (n , m) −> a i n i t (m, x )”
paramParentRule : : Princ −> Var −> Rule
paramParentRule pr inc var =
Rule [ paramAtom pr inc var [ term n , term x ] ,
parentAtom term n term m ]
( Ex i s t s [ ] [ paramAtom pr inc var [ term m , term x ] ] )
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t r an s l a t e Sk e l e t on : : Form −> Rule
t r an s l a t e Sk e l e t on ( Ske le ton vars s t rands assums prec s ) =
l e t nodeVars = take ( l ength s t rands ) var ns
precVars = take ( l ength prec s ) var ms
p r i n c s = map (\ ( Strand ( pr inc , ) ) −> pr inc ) s t rands in
Rule [ ]
( Ex i s t s ( nodeVars ++ Map. keys vars ++
map f s t precVars ++ map snd precVars )
( sortConj (Map. t oL i s t vars ) ++
assumConj assums ++
concat ( zipWith t r an s l a t eS t r and st rands nodeVars ) ++
concat ( zipWith ( precConj p r i n c s ) prec s precVars ) ) )
t r an s l a t eS t r and : : Strand −> Var −> Conjunction
t r an s l a t eS t r and ( Strand ( pr inc , index ) maplets ) var =
l e t params = map (\ ( v , m) −> (v , t rans lateMesg id m) ) maplets in
nodeAtom ( princ , index ) ( Var iab le var ) :
paramConj pr inc ( Var iab le var ) params
{− Conjunct ions −}
−− ” b i n i t (n , b) & n2 i n i t (n , n2 ) & . . . ”
paramConj : : Princ −> Term −> [ ( Param , Term ) ] −> Conjunction
paramConj pr inc node params =
map (\ ( name , term ) −> paramAtom pr inc name [ node , term ] ) params
−− ”Name( a ) & Text (x )”
sortConj : : [ ( Var , Sort ) ] −> Conjunction
sortConj = map (\ ( v , s ) −> sortAtom s ( Var iab le v ) )
−− ”Nonorig ( Privk<b>) & Orig (x )
assumConj : : [ SkelAssum ] −> Conjunction
assumConj =
map (\ ( SkelAssum pred mesg )
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−> assumAtom pred ( trans lateMesg id mesg ) )
−− resp2 (m0) & i n i t 3 (m1) & lp r e c (m0, n2 )
−− & lp r e c (m1, n3 ) & prec (m0, m1)”
precConj : : [ Pr inc ] −> Precedes −> (Var , Var ) −> Conjunction
precConj p r i n c s ( Precedes ( s , n ) ( s ’ , n ’ ) ) (v , v ’ ) =
l e t t = Var iab le v
t ’ = Var iab le v ’ in
[ nodeAtom ( pr i n c s ! ! ( s − 1) , n ) t ,
nodeAtom ( pr i n c s ! ! ( s ’ − 1) , n ’ ) t ’ ,
lprecAtom t ( Var iab le $ var ns ! ! ( s − 1 ) ) ,
lprecAtom t ’ ( Var iab le $ var ns ! ! ( s ’ − 1 ) ) ,
precAtom t t ’ ]
{− ∗Atoms∗ −}
−− ” prec (m, n)”
precAtom : : Term −> Term −> Atom
precAtom n1 n2 = Relat ion ” precedes ” [ n1 , n2 ]
−− ” l p r e c (m, n)”
lprecAtom : : Term −> Term −> Atom
lprecAtom n1 n2 = Relat ion ” l p r e c ” [ n1 , n2 ]
−− ” n 1 i n i t (n , x )”
paramAtom : : Princ −> Param −> [ Term ] −> Atom
paramAtom pr inc param args =
Relat ion (param ++ ” ” ++ pr inc ) args
−− ” i n i t 1 (n)”
nodeAtom : : Node −> Term −> Atom
nodeAtom ( princ , index ) node =
Relat ion ( pr inc ++ show index ) [ node ]
−− ”Node (n)”
sortAtom : : Sort −> Term −> Atom
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sortAtom so r t param = Relat ion s o r t [ param ]
−− ”Send (n , Enc<n1 , Pubk<b>>)”
eventAtom : : D i r e c t i on −> Term −> Term −> Atom
eventAtom d i r node mesg = Relat ion d i r [ node , mesg ]
−− ”Nonorig ( Privk<b>)”
assumAtom : : Pred i cate −> Term −> Atom
assumAtom pred term = Relat ion pred [ term ]
−− ”Parent (n , m)”
parentAtom : : Term −> Term −> Atom
parentAtom parent ch i l d = Relat ion ”Parent” [ ch i ld , parent ]
−− ” L i s t en (Enc<x , y>)”
l i stenAtom : : Term −> Atom
listenAtom term = Relat ion ” L i s t en ” [ term ]
{− ∗Naming∗ −}
var n = ” n”
var m = ” m”
var x = ” x”
var y = ” y”
term n = Var iab le var n
term m = Var iab le var m
term x = Var iab le var x
term y = Var iab le var y
var ns = map (\x −> ” n” ++ show x) [ 0 . . ]
var ms = map (\x −> (” m” ++ show x , ” m”
++ show (x + 1 ) ) ) [ 0 , 2 . . ]
compi leSort : : SExpr a −> Sort
compi leSort (S s o r t ) = case s o r t o f




” skey ” −> ”SKey”
”akey” −> ”AKey”
”mesg” −> ”Basic ”
{− ∗Transc r ip t i on ∗ −}
i n s t anc e Show Theory where
showsPrec (Theory name r u l e s ) =
formatTheory $ map ( showsPrec 0) r u l e s
i n s t anc e Show Rule where
showsPrec ( Rule [ ] rhs ) =
formatRule ( showString ”True ”) ( showsPrec 0 rhs )
showsPrec ( Rule l h s rhs ) =
formatRule ( formatConj (map ( showsPrec 0) l h s ) )
( showsPrec 0 rhs )
i n s t anc e Show Ex i s t e n t i a l where
showsPrec ( Ex i s t s vars conj ) =
f o rmatEx i s t en t i a l
(map showString vars )
( formatConj (map ( showsPrec 0) conj ) )
i n s t anc e Show Atom where
showsPrec ( Re lat ion r e l terms ) =
formatAtom ( showString r e l ) (map ( showsPrec 0) terms )
showsPrec ( Equation l e f t r i g h t ) =
formatEquation ( showsPrec 0 l e f t ) ( showsPrec 0 r i g h t )
i n s t anc e Show Term where
showsPrec ( Var iab le var ) = showString var
showsPrec ( Function fun subterms ) =
formatTerm ( showString fun ) (map ( showsPrec 0) subterms )
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{− ∗Formatting∗ −}
−− from Haske l l wik i
compose : : [ a −> a ] −> a −> a
compose f s v = f o l d l ( . ) id f s $ v
joinShows : : S t r ing −> [ ShowS ] −> ShowS
joinShows del im = compose . i n t e r s p e r s e ( showString del im )
formatTheory : : [ ShowS ] −> ShowS
formatTheory r u l e s = joinShows ”” r u l e s
formatRule l h s rhs =
lh s . showString ” −> ” . rhs . showString ”\n”
f o rmatEx i s t en t i a l [ ] body = body
f o rmatEx i s t en t i a l vars body =
showString ” Ex i s t s ” .
joinShows ” , ” vars . showString ” : ” . body
formatConj con junct s = joinShows ” & ” conjunct s
formatEquation l h s rhs = lh s . showString ” = ” . rhs
formatAtom r e l vars =
r e l . showString ”(” . joinShows ” , ” vars . showString ”)”
formatTerm fun subterms =
fun . showString ”<” . joinShows ” , ” subterms . showString ”>”
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